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Abstract:
The European electricity sector is facing substantial structural changes. An issue of primary interest in
this regard is the interaction of environmental problems and liberalisation.  This paper will illustrate
the most relevant issues that compound the task of providing a reliable framework for environmental
policy applied to the European electricity sector. In particular, we take into account that:
• The new European market for electricity is becoming a complex institution that most probably
will not be characterised by perfect competition;
• Imperfect competition matters for environmental regulation;
• The present regulatory situation in Europe is complex and not homogeneous, as far as
environment is concerned.
Thus, only very limited policy lessons can be drawn from economic theory. We present a simple
numerical model of the environmental regulation of the European electricity sector. We compare the
use of environmental taxes in a perfect competition benchmark with their use under imperfect
competition. This allows us to illustrate the incentives for environmental policy distortions for
national governments that imperfect competition may bring about.
Address for correspondence:  Andrea Bigano





                                                       
1 FIRST DRAFT. PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE.
2 The author is grateful to Stef Proost, Joahn Eyckmans, Bert Willems, Denise Van Regemorter, Kurt
Van Dender, Guido Pepermans, Silvia Pagliero and Inge Mayeres for their comments and advice
during the preparation of this draft. The author is also indebted with the participants to EAERE 2000
Conference in Rethymno and with the participants to the EAERE-FEEM-VIU Summer School in
Venice for their comments. All remaining errors are the author’s responsibility. The author’s research
is supported by a grant of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.2
e-mail: Andrea.Bigano@econ.kuleuven.ac.be.3
I. Introduction
The European electricity sector is facing substantial structural changes. The opening of the
Single Market for electricity generates important opportunities, but brings about important
concerns too. An issue of primary interest in this regard is the interaction of environmental
problems and liberalisation.
This paper is divided in two parts. In the first part of the paper, we will illustrate the most
relevant issues that compound the task of providing a reliable framework for environmental
policy applied to the European electricity sector. To anticipate, we will point out that:
• The new European market for electricity is becoming a complex institution that most
probably will not be characterised by perfect competition;
• Imperfect competition matters for environmental regulation;
• The present regulatory situation in Europe is complex and not homogeneous, as far as
environment is concerned;
• Thus, only very limited policy lessons can be drawn from economic theory. More precise
indications should be supported by a more realistic framework, such as an empirical
(numerical) model tailored on the features of the European electricity sector.
In the second part, we build a preliminary and simplified version of one such model. In
particular Section 3 presents a formal model of the environmental regulation of the European
electricity sector. We first present a benchmark model with perfect competition, then we extend
it to cover imperfect competition. Numerical analysis is presented in Section 4, and section 5
concludes.
 
2. Electricity Generation and the Environment in Europe
2.1 The Market Structure
The goals of the liberalisation and of the unification of the electricity market were set in 1992,
in the Directive 96/92/EC. This directive stipulates that the market will be opened in three
stages. By February 1999, final consumers with an annual consumption in excess of 40 GW
should be able to shop around Europe to satisfy their electricity needs. A further opening to
consumers with more than 20 GWh demanded per year has taken place in 2000. In 2003 also
consumers whose annual consumption exceeds 9 GWh will be admitted to the market. It is4
estimated that this will amount to roughly one third of the present market size. After 2006, all
consumers will be admitted to the market
3.
Notwithstanding the efforts of the European Commission, some important factors suggest that
perfect competition is not the most likely institutional shape of the Single Market for electricity.
• For one thing the opening will be gradual, allowing national producers to keep their market
power on the majority of their consumers for the next six years. This will probably give to
the stronger among them enough respite to consolidate their already privileged position on
the national markets.
• A second important factor is the transmission cost. Given the physical characteristics of the
electric line, this cost increases with the distance and the load. This can create serious
barriers to entry at least in the short and medium run. This can also lead to market
fragmentation, in the sense that neighbouring States are more likely to trade than distant
countries. In the long run, there is of course the option of investment in transport capacity,
but, in absence of action on the part of the States or the Commission, there are doubts that
this will happen in an imperfectly competitive setting. In fact, as suggested by Cardell et al
(1996) and Smeers (1997), an easy way to maintain market power in the European
electricity market is to saturate the existing transmission lines and not to build new ones.
•  Moreover, a third possible factor of market fragmentation is included in the liberalisation
directive itself. Each member state is given the freedom of choice of the institutional form
of access to the national grid (transmission and distribution) among three options:
Regulated Third Party Access, Negotiated Third Party Access, and Single Buyer
4. Since
most countries have opted for the first option, this leaves to each government the possibility
to determine different access prices to their national grids.
• Finally, entry may be technologically constrained. More specifically, the kind of
technologies that may be available to new entrants are probably the small scale gas turbine
or CHP gas plants, which are typically best suited for peak load generation. Thus, it is
                                                       
3 According to the last computation of the Commission “the (minimum) average Community share of
electricity market opening” required by the directive will then amount to 26.48%. In fact, the actual
share opened to competition will be around 60% according to the Commission’s estimates, due to the
fact that in some member countries (Finland, Norway, Sweden Germany and United Kingdom) a
completely liberalised market already exist, and other countries (Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain) are
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However, Belgium, France, Ireland and Luxembourg, not complying to the minimum requirements of
the directive are going to open the market initially only to industrial customers consuming more than
100 GWh a year. Greece has obtained a two years’ prorogation.
4 Italy and Portugal have chosen this option.5
most likely that the bulk of demand will be satisfied by the incumbent large producers that
have already undertaken large investments in base load capacity.
 
Having established that perfect competition will most likely not be the institutional form of the
Single Market for electricity, it is quite difficult to say a priori which kind of imperfect
competition will take place. Even when institutional arrangements are designed to bring about
competitive pricing, the real world implementation may result in something different. For
instance, Green and Newbery (1992) assess whether the deregulation actually implemented in
the United Kingdom in 1990 is preferable to a regulated setting. It turns out that either
regulation or a more fragmented structure would be advisable, and that the Bertrand
duopolistic market engendered by the reform fails to attain the marginal cost pricing outcome
that the British government expected. If investment in generation capacity is also   motivated
by strategic considerations, one should consider a combination of Cournot competition for the
investment stage with Bertrand competition once investments in capacity are fixed
5.
 Now, economic theory has singled out an important link between imperfect competition and
environmental policy. Generally speaking, the source of the problem is that, under oligopolistic
competition, firms make positive profits. This provides an incentive to national governments to
help domestic firms earn higher profits in the international arena, in order to increase national
welfare or tax revenues (depending on the governments’ objective function). In particular
Brander and Spencer (1985) analysed the rent-shifting behaviour of two governments that try
to support their national producer in an international Cournot duopoly, by means of export
subsidies. These subsidies act as devices that commit national producers to a certain level of
output and hence to a higher market share than the one they would have achieved in a simple
Cournot equilibrium. An analogous role can be played by any external support that can help
the domestic firm to commit to a certain level of output in case of Cournot competition, or to a
certain price in case of Bertrand competition. These indirect commitment devices may be used
when explicit trade policies are forbidden by trade agreements. National environmental
policies, having a direct influence on the firms’ production costs, may be used by member
states to this purpose
6. As shown by Barrett (1994) and Conrad (1993, 1995), the form of
                                                       
5  There are however some empirical indications that Cournot competition may prevail in electricity
markets. See Hogan (1997) and Wei and Smeers, (1997) for some arguments in favour of Cournot
competitions for the electricity market.
6 Another way to indirectly subsidise the national producers on the international markets that is
peculiar to the electricity sector is the treatment of stranded costs. Stranded costs can be defined as
fixed costs that were imposed by the regulator before the liberalisation and that will not be possible to
recover any longer after the opening of the market (see Pepermans and Proost (1999)). From the
theoretical point of view, there is no efficiency reason for allowing the recover of such costs. However
some producers have been recognised the right to a reimbursement. The problem is that there is no6
competition has some consequences on the kind of distortions that can affect the environmental
policies of the member States. In particular they found that, compared to the simple first best
policies based on the rule that equates marginal social benefit to marginal social cost,
environmental policies chosen by governments in the Nash equilibrium are tougher under
Bertrand competition and less strict under Cournot competition. Thus, in general,
environmental policies left to the initiative of member States under imperfect competition will
deviate from the first best allocation, in a direction hardly predictable given the number of
factors involved.
 
 2.2. The Environmental Issues
Electricity generation can cause a wide variety of environmental problems. A reasonably
exhaustive inventory of the external damages involved goes beyond the scope of this paper, and
can be found in the ExternE report (1999). The most relevant negative impacts on the
environment and on human health of electricity generation are summarised in Table 1.
 It must be noted that external effects of electricity generation can take place within a certain
range from the source. How wide is this range, and with which intensity these effects can take
place as the distance from the source increases, depends on various factors, in particular on the
chemical and physical characteristics of the pollutant and on the media in which it is
discharged. For instance air emissions can travel a lot, and combine with other gaseous
compounds to form other noxious substances (e.g. NOx as ozone precursors).
For some impacts, like visual impacts and noise pollution, the damage is limited to a very small
area around the source. For most impacts, however it is almost impossible to trace down
exactly their dispersion path. Reasonable approximation, limited to the physical spreading of
some pollutants can be reached by means of dispersion models, which, however, generally
disregard chemical interactions.
                                                                                                                                                              
consensus at the European level about which costs should be included in such definition, and that
some government have (correctly) denied any such costs recovering to their national producers. This
situation may give an advantage on the European market to the countries that have allowed a
substantial recovery.7
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The fact that some pollutant can be still noxious at a long distance from the source has some
important implications for environmental policies, in particular when the damages of these
emissions affect not only the country where the responsible plant is located, but also the
neighbouring country. This possibility is not completely independent from the national
regulators’ choices: building high stacks or locating the plant close to the borders, will surely
reduce local domestic pollution, but most likely it will bring about an increase in the air
pollution levels abroad
9. More generally transboundary pollution makes it more difficult to
determine the damage caused, and consequently, the policy measure to be taken. This can
happen because the burden of the damage is not entirely borne by the responsible country, and
                                                       
7 Mortality refers to the increase in the probability of death for pathologic causes related to pollution;
morbidity refers to the reduction in income and general well being due to diseases caused by pollution.
8 This external cost affects all the technologies, even the most environmental friendly like wind
turbines. This value depends solely on the preferences of the individuals affected, and it is thus very
subjective.
9 From the regulatory point of view, in general, each country acting in isolation will address only
domestic environmental problems. However, this will be inefficient from the point of view of the
collective welfare of all the country involved.8
this calls for a complex attribution of the shares of the resulting damages between countries
differently affected by the same phenomenon. Typically, the scope for co-ordination or even
harmonisation of environmental policy at the supra-national level widens in presence of
transboundary pollution.
 2.3. Environmental regulation in the member states
10
During the last 30 years the European Commission, has taken an increasingly active stand in
dealing with environmental problems. Most of the European environmental legislation
addresses general environmental issues. However it covers, although not directly, most of the
environmental problems caused by the electricity sector. A discussion of the evolution and the
main characteristics of the European environmental policy goes beyond the scope of this paper.
The interested reader is referred to Knill (1997). The important point to note here is that this
policy has acted as a common denominator for the environmental policies of the member
States, often filling the gaps in their regulations, but never reaching even an incomplete
harmonisation of the latter.
There are substantial differences among the member States as to the actual implementation of
the directives and, ultimately, as to the national environmental policies. In particular, for some
regulations, the subsidiarity principle offers quite a broad leeway for different choices as to the
actual instruments used to reach a given policy target.
Mostly used are technical standards on emissions of certain pollutants, particularly air
pollutants covered in the LCPD/1988, namely SO2, NOx, and dust. A number of countries have
implemented stronger emissions standards than those prescribed by the directive, generally by
means of voluntary agreements between the Government and the producers. This is the case,
for instance, of Belgium and the Netherlands. Some countries have also programmed
reductions in CO2 emissions. In particular, Germany aims at curbing 25 to 30% of the 1987
level in 2005, whereas Denmark and Austria aim at a 20% reduction in the period 1988-2005;
in 1991; Belgium has fixed a 5% CO2 emissions reduction target (with respect to the 1990
level), to be reached in 2000.
These emission targets are generally implemented by means of command and control standards,
although in some countries they are supported by taxes and/or subsidies. Tradable permits are
not yet used in Europe. However, some features of tradable permits are shared by the German
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Countries may have taken places in the last months.9
air emission permit system. In fact, in Germany, deviations from the assigned standards are
allowed if emissions are decreased at other plants of the same owner or also of a third part, and
the overall reduction is higher than it would have been if the required standard for the deviating
plant had been reached.
Sometimes the standards on emissions are coupled with technical standards on the abatement
technologies used. Licensing is always required, after environmental impact assessment as
prescribed by Council Directive 85/337/EEC. It has relevance from the environmental point of
view when the requirements for the license include prescriptions related to the use of the site
and of water resources, to the impact on the landscape, to the safety of the plant, to the
monitoring of emissions, and again to the abatement technologies to be employed. All these
regulatory instruments, however, are not directly related to the environmental damages actually
produced by power generation; rather, they generally refer to some politically determined
environmental quality objective.
A number of states have implemented environmental taxes. According to the European
Commission Communication 97-9 of 26
th March 1997 (on environmental taxes in the Single
market), carbon-energy taxes were applied, up to October 1996, in Austria, Denmark, Finland,
the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. However, again, those are never directly related to the
external damages caused by the emissions (i.e. they are hardly true Pigouvian taxes). The most
widely used taxes, relevant for environmental policy, are energy/carbon taxes. They are second
best instrument insofar they are expressed in terms of tax per unit of energy, and not per unit of
pollutant emitted. However, they should be somehow still linked to the externality caused by
carbon emissions if the amount of the tax is commensurate to the external damage per unit of
energy, or to the carbon content of the fuel used for electricity production. A similar tax, not
completely classifiable as “carbon tax”, is the “Fossil Fuel Levy” used in the United Kingdom.
It is however part of an environmental policy specifically aimed at reducing air pollution. In
fact, it is aimed at financing the “Non Fossil Fuel Obligation” that requires that generators
produce a part of their output using non-fossil fuels. The tax is levied on the final user of the
electricity and it is not actually based on the carbon content of the electricity produced
11.
Taxes on sulphur (content in fuels) were at the same date applied in Denmark, France, Norway
and Sweden, while at that time only France and Sweden had implemented taxes on NOx. Since
1994, Norway has a similar tax on CO2, levied on coal, diesel, mineral oil, gasoline at
comparatively high levels in Europe. For gas, again according to Oosterhuis et al., it amounted
                                                       
11 In 1996 it amounted to 0.3 ECU per MWh according to Oosterhuis et al.(1996)10
to 0.83 NOK/m³ in 1996
12. It has however a very limited effect on electricity generation, given
the preponderance of hydropower (about 98% of capacity in 1994).
More widespread are taxes on wastes. As far as the electricity sector is concerned, taxes on
waste processing and on hazardous wastes are relevant. The first one are applied in all the
European countries but Greece and Luxembourg, the second ones are implemented in Austria,
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Norway and Portugal.
Finally also relevant for the electricity sector are taxes on water use. Again, according to the
Commission Communication mentioned above, in October 1996 taxes on water use were
present in Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Norway and United Kingdom.
Other instruments used are subsidies for renewable energy sources or for less polluting
technologies, energy saving policies, demand side management. The aforementioned British
“Fossil Fuel Obligation” can be seen as an example of the first policy, since the obligation to
produce a share of the electricity output is financed through the Fossil Fuel Levy, which
weights completely on the shoulders of, in this respect, captive consumers
13. Incentives and
subsidies for using renewable energy sources are used also in the Netherlands, in Denmark (for
investments in photovoltaic cells, windmills and bio-gas technologies) and in the United
Kingdom (only if “cost effective”). In Sweden, there are investment grants encouraging wind
power and solar heating. In Austria, subsidies can be obtained for the installation of abatement
technologies.
Subsidies for cleaner technologies, environmental standards and taxes normally result in some
fuel substitution and in a more socially efficient use of electricity. Fuel substitution, however,
can not only result from the cost minimising behaviour of the electricity producers, but may
also be imposed by political decisions within the national energy policy framework. If these
decisions take into account their environmental consequences, or are driven by independent
environmental reasons, they can be regarded as independent environmental policy tools. An
extreme example of environmentally driven fuel policy decision is, for instance, the ban on
nuclear power generation. In Europe, Denmark, Italy, Ireland, Norway, and Portugal have
already foregone the use of this energy source, Germany is presently about to close its nuclear
plants, and Sweden has programmed the phasing out of its nuclear capacity by 2010. A less
                                                       
12 Around 0.096 ECU/m³.
13 Put in another way, this policy consists of two elements: a subsidy to producers and a tax for
consumers.11
radical option is to seek substitution possibilities within the available technologies, and to
program future investments consequently. This has been happening all over Europe in the last
decade, the typical patterns being the substitution of coal and oil with fuels with a lower
polluting impact on the quality of air: natural gas, gas produced from coal, nuclear power
generation and to a lesser extent, renewable sources. Other strategies often adopted entailed the
use of more energy efficient power generation technologies (as for instance the Combined Heat-
Power plants) and the investment in retrofit abatement technologies for the existing plants when
fuel or technology substitution was impossible or in addition to these options.
3. Modelling Environmental Regulation of the Electricity Sector
 We will now focus on the problem of building a suitable computable model for assessing the
environmental regulation f the European electricity sector under imperfect competition. Our
aim is to provide a framework where incentives to distort environmental policies can in
principle affect governments’ decisions along the lines of Barrett (1994) and Conrad (1996).
In particular we will compare a cost-minimising perfect competition benchmark with two
alternative institutional settings where electricity producers engage in Cournot competition:
a) a “responsible governments” case, where policy makers take full account of national
environmental damages, and do not help national producers by distorting they
environmental instruments;
b) a “strategic governments case”, where policy makers distort environmental policies as a
substitute for  an explicit trade policy;
We will start by describing the competitive case. We will then describe the Cournot game
played by the firms for a given set of environmental measures. Finally we will specify the
details of the two alternative policy regimes.
3.1. The competitive benchmark
 As a starting point we will rely upon a very simplified and static version of the cost-
minimising sub-module of the CES-ELEC model (presented in Bigano, Proost and Van
Rompuy (2000)) and we extend it to four European nations. In that paper a comparison was
made between alternative emission regulation systems with the help of a dynamic partial
equilibrium model of the Belgian electricity market. The model represented the generation,12
investment and pricing decisions of the utility and of the independent producers, as well as the
demand for electricity by small and large consumers.
In this section we will present a simplified picture of environmental regulation of the electricity
sector for four neighbouring European countries: Belgium, The Netherlands, France and
Germany. Our model consists of:
• A supply module for electricity generation in each country;
• A demand module for electricity generation in each country;
• An environmental module describing external damages caused by electricity generation in
each country;
• A regulatory module describing environmental policies binding for electricity generation in
each country;
• A transmission module describing how physically can electricity be exchanged in the
international market;
Electricity generation takes place in all the mentioned countries; in reality, production
conditions differ among them. For instance, France relies more heavily on nuclear generation
than the other countries, gas turbines are more widespread in the Netherlands, whereas the
share of coal plants is still important in Germany.
Transmission capacities are fixed and countries can use international transmission lines to
trade electricity. The only two countries lacking a direct interconnection are France and the
Netherlands.
In this paper many simplifying assumptions are taken. We abstract from technical issues posed
by the physics of electricity transmissions, we assume that all the four countries are
interconnected with each other, and that the technical characteristics of their generation parks
and the environmental damages are everywhere the same.
 We consider only environmental damages caused by emissions of air pollutants and hence we
disregard other external effects (e.g. accident risk for nuclear plants). However in the ExternE
database only for air pollutants a directly link with the emissions can be traced down, whereas
other external damages are expressed directly in function of the amount of electricity produced.
Thus, any tax aimed at correcting these effects would result just in a technology-specific output
tax. Moreover, cross-border damages will not be considered for the moment, although the
model can be easily extended to incorporate them.
In each country, an electric utility supplies electricity to the grid using the following
technologies:13
Table 2. Generation technologies:
 NP • Nuclear power plants
CP • Coal power plants
MIXP • Mixed fossil fuel power plants
GP • Gas turbines
KEROP • Kerosene turbines
HYP • Hydro power turbines
WP • Wind turbines
WAP • Municipal waste incinerators
CHP • Gas based co-generation plants
Electricity consumers buy electricity from the municipal distribution company at a price per
kWh. This tariff includes marginal costs (production, transport, distribution) and a rent that
goes to the municipal distributor,. Under perfect competition, the share accruing to producers
just covers their marginal costs. Hence, to represent a multi-nodal market equilibrium under
perfect competition we use the minimisation of production costs for a given demand. For the
algebraic representation of the behaviour of each agent, we will use the following conventions:
SETS PARAMETERS
cen    central power producers (utilities) a  distribution of consumption across
sub-periods
i        sub-periods within year AV    available capacity
n,m      nodes (countries: B, D, F, NL) af     availability factor
z       technologies dam  emission damage (EUROS/ton)
em   emissions  (NOx, SO2 , CO2 , TSP) e      emission rate (ton/MWh)
VARIABLES q  interconnection dummy
P       electricity price (EUROS/MWh) x      generation cost (EUROS/MWh)
P     net producer surplus (EUROS) l       length of sub-period (hours)
Q  consumption (MWh) tra    transport cost (EUROS/MWh)
T      emission tax (EUROS/ton) b  weight of Consumers’ Surplus
TAX tax revenue (EUROS)
X      production (MW)14
The electric generators
 We assume a central producer (or electric utility) in each country. Under perfect competition,
producers behave as cost-minimising firms. Since competition sets prices equal to marginal
costs, all they have to do is to minimise the total costs of electricity supply. Generation costs
here consist of production costs x
cen,z,i,n and taxes T
cen,z,n. Emission taxes apply to unabated
emissions. Notice that production X
cen,z,i,n,m is indexed not only for the period in which is
produced, the firm that produces it, the technology used for production, but also for the country
where it is generated and the country where it is sent to. This allow us to regard the sum of
X
cen,z,i,n,m over m as production per unit of time in country n with technology z, and the sum of
X
cen,z,i,n,m over z as sales per unit of time of a firm based in n to country m.
 The utility's cost minimisation problem is
 (1)
Assuming quadratic abatement costs, it is straightforward to see that each producer will choose
a level of abatement per unit of emission equal to the unit tax on that emission. Equation 1 then
becomes:
 (1’)
The electric producers must take into account capacity constraints for its power plants and
electricity flow constraints for its international electricity sales
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Equation 2: The utility's capacity constraints
(2)
Equation 3: Maximum power flow between countries:
(3)
Equation 4: supply constraints in each country:
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The overall equilibrium is reached when all the costs are minimised, for a given demand.
 It can then be represented as




C Min ,   (5)
subject to Equations 2- 4.
Equation 2 simply stipulates that output should never exceed the exogenously set available
capacity. Equation 3 requires that power sent by a firm based in country n to country m is in
period i never exceeds the maximum capacity of the line connecting n to m, and, conversely,
that power sent by a firm based in country m to country n is in period i never exceeds the
maximum capacity of the line connecting m to n.  In fact, this amounts to assuming that any
two countries are connected by two separated lines, one for each flow direction. This
assumption allows us to abstract from physical properties of interconnected lines that usually
imply additional non-obvious constraints on power flows. Equation 4 specifies that power
generation plus net imports in each country must be enough to cover demand in each period.
Moreover, all variables are required to be positive.
 This formulation holds for exogenously set taxes. If environmental damages are to be fully
internalised, problem (5) becomes
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 The last term in the RHS of (5’) indicates that environmental taxes paid by producers should
be regarded as a pure transfers (they are not wasted money from the community’s point of
view)
 .
Total emission damages DAMn take into account emission damages of all pollutants. All
emissions are evaluated using a quadratic damage function:
(6)
or
The parameter damem,z,n summarizes the characteristics of emissions of pollutant em from a
plant using technology z in country n
14. Notice that in this formulation damages are quadratic
in the total emission produced during the year, and hence, marginal damages do not vary across
periods. Abatement effort can thus take place, and taxes can be paid, just once a year.
Alternatively, we could have allowed for time dependent damages. This of course would have
required different taxes in different sub-periods, and hence a permanent monitoring of
emissions. We prefer the damage function specified in (6) both for is slightly better
computational tractability and for its slightly superior realism.
The first order conditions with respect to taxes imply then the well known rule that equates
taxes to marginal damages, or
(7)
 
where are the unabated emissions.
                                                       
14 Note that in this formulation, each government cares only about those environmental damages
affecting its own territory. The presence of transboundary pollution makes this sub-optimal from an
international point of view.17
3.2. A Simple Model of European Electricity Market with Imperfect Competition
The typical setting in the applications of the New Trade Theory to environmental policy issues
is a multistage model solved by backward induction.
 Following this approach, our model consists of two stages. In the first stage, governments
decide their environmental policies taking as given both the reaction of the firms to their choice,
and the strategies played by other governments. In the second stage, firms engage in a Cournot
competition game where their costs are determined (besides the exogenous parameters) by the
environmental policies set by governments in the previous stage. Backward induction
prescribes to start with the characterisation of the firms’ equilibrium behaviour for any given
set of taxes. Then governments’ response to firm to firms’ behaviour can be considered.
A. Cournot Competition among Producers
Suppose then that firms behave in a non-competitive way in the international electricity market.
In each node m, consumers are prepared to pay for each Mw purchased a price
 Pm=(am – bmQm), where Qm is the total quantity sold at that node. Each producer then
maximises his profits taking as given the taxes set by governments and the strategies of the
other producers. Profits consist of the revenues at each node, minus production and
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subject to  Equations 2- 4 and given X-cen,z,i,-n,m , Tem,z,,n , Tem,z,-n , where Ccen,z,n is defined in (1’).
For any given set of taxes Tem,z,,n , Tem,z,-n, the equilibrium is characterised by the Kuhn-Tucker
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where
 is  a compact way of expressing Equations 2- 4  as constraints to the firm’s problem, and
lK,cen,n are the Lagrange multipliers of these constraints. Conditions 7 implicitly define the
reaction functions of each firm. Moreover, they imply that in equilibrium the electricity
generated by each firm is a function of the taxes set by the four governments:
 (10)
B. Welfare function of the governments
Also national governments engage in a Nash game: each of them sets its own environmental
policy taking as given the environmental policies decided by the other governments.
Each government will evaluate the consequences of environmental regulations using a Social
Welfare function SWn. This function encompasses the weighted sum of private surplus of
consumers CS
n  and the surplus of the producers Pcen,n , the tax revenue TAXn generated in the
electricity market, minus environmental damages DAMn. Each government will choose
environmental taxes in order to maximise SWn or
 (11)
taking as given the other government’s taxes. Total tax revenue TAX
n from the electricity sector
consists of the total of environmental taxes:
.
(12)
Again, total emission damages DAMn take into account emission damages of all pollutants,
evaluated using a quadratic damage function, as in the perfect competition case.
The crucial issue in the New Trade Theory applied to environmental policy is how national
governments will react to the non-competitive behaviour of the producers. If governments are
fully aware that their environmental policy decisions can influence the equilibrium output of the
firms, they may have an incentive to distort their taxes in order to help the national producers.
On the other hand, if they overlook this strategic effect, they will have no incentive deviate
from the first-best rule that equates unit taxes to marginal damages (at the non-competitive
, ,
, ,
n n n cen n n T DAM TAX Ð CS SW MAX
n z em
- + + = b














n z em n z em n z em
i z
m n i z cen n i n e T T X l TAX
, ,


























output level).  We refer to these two different attitudes of the governments as to the “strategic
governments” case and, respectively, the “responsible governments” case.
C. Responsible Governments
 If national governments are prepared to take fully into account the external damages generated
by their producers, the best they can do is to set unit taxes equal to marginal damages (at the
non-competitive output level). In this case, neither CS
n  nor Pcen,n  are regarded as indirectly
dependent on the taxes via the effect of the latter on the equilibrium output levels: only the
direct effect of own taxes on costs and on tax revenues are considered and hence can affect the
first order conditions of problem (9):
(12)
implying again, as in the first best case,
D. Strategic Governments
 If national governments are aware of the consequences of their environmental policies on trade
and are prepared to exploit them in order to help their national producers in the international
markets, problem  (9) reads as follows
15:
(13)
Applying the envelope theorem
16 to get rid of the terms, in the derivative of
the profit function, Condition (12) becomes
                                                       
15  Here we drop the unambiguous indexes in order to economise space.
16  The envelope theorem can of course be applied only when an interior solution to the firms’ stage
exists. This however does not prejudice the existence of strategic incentives also in case of corner
solutions of the firms’ stage.
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or, more synthetically ,
 (14)
 .
The term Fem,z,n captures the strategic incentives of the governments. Under reasonable
assumptions on the revenue function and the consumer’s surplus function, it is positive,
meaning that governments have an incentive to reduce own taxes in order to expand national
profits and consumption. These assumptions have been widely debated in the theoretical
literature on Trade and Environment, and will be disregarded here
17. In the rest of the paper we
will focus on the methodological issues related to the integration of this theoretical framework
into a computable model for the European electricity market.
4. Simulation Exercises
We present here a very simplified example of multi-nodal computable model for electricity.
 In order to focus on the effects of imperfect competition only, we consider four identical
countries. These countries are all interconnected by means of transmission lines, all entailing
the same transmission costs and all having the same transmission capacity
18. We consider six
sub-periods within a year (base, load, medium, shoulder, high, and peak) all having the same
length across the four countries. Also, consumers’ demand function and the way they allocate
their purchases of electricity through sub-periods do not depend on their place of residence.
In each country there is just one producer who can generate electric power using several plants.
The technologies at his disposal are listed in the table below, along with their characteristic
parameters. These data are for illustrative purpose only and are based on those used in Bigano
et al. (2000) for the CES-ELEC model on Belgium. We also refer to the same study for the
ExternE estimates of the external damages of air emissions. Again these values are taken for
                                                       
17 The interested Reader is referred to Barrett (1994), Conrad (1993), Ulph. (1997), and Bigano
(1999).
18 More specifically, we assume 5 GW of capacity for international lines, and infinite transmission
capacity within a country. Transmission costs are fictitiously set at 8.9 Euros /MWh for international21
illustrative purposes only and conveniently scaled to make them consistent with our quadratic
damage function. These damage estimates are just taken as a measure of the different degree of
noxiousness of different pollutants
 19. In want of more accurate data, we use the estimates for
coal plants also for all other combustion plants not fuelled with natural gas.






























Pulverised coal coal 2.54 1.56 84 4.179 6.134 906 529 1475.04 16.43
Nuclear plant nuclear 2.6 1.31 85 3818.63 13.57
Gas turbine
(gas)
nat. gas 1.80 2.97 84 342 7 383 1418.71 19.05
Oil & Gas
conventional
mix 2.35 2.06 84 1.174 4.482 672 498 403.20 19.29
Gas turbine
(kerosene)
kerosene 2.60 3.37 90 1.735 1.799 720 713 7939.31 47.38
Hydro power hydro 2.92 0 89 40.05





2.34 0 84 2.241 861 672 498 24.19 1.67
STAG for
cogeneration
nat. gas 2.55 2.97 80 473 9 530 16.00 24.29
















Pulverised coal coal 12141 13036 18 24536
Nuclear plant nuclear 0 0 0 0
STAG nat. gas 13553 11338 18 0
Oil & Gas
conventional
mix 12141 13036 18 24536
Gas turbine
(kerosene)
kerosene 12141 13036 18 24536
Hydro power hydro 0 0 0 0
wind turbine wind 0 0 0 0
waste incinerator mun. waste 12141 13036 18 24536
STAG for
cogeneration
nat. gas 13553 11338 18 0
                                                                                                                                                              
lines and 0.25 Euros /MWh for national lines, again loosely drawing on the data set used in Bigano et
al. (2000).
19 By no means these estimates can be regarded any longer as marginal damages as in it was assumed
in Bigano et al. (2000), where a linear damage function was used.  Marginal damages now depend on
the equilibrium production level.
20 Notice that since plants using only gas have virtually no TSP emissions, the external cost per ton of
emission computed for the reference gas plant is zero. This is a consequence of the bottom-up
procedure and does not imply that gas plants’ emissions contain a harmless kind of TSP. They just do
not contain them at all. Moreover, the estimate for CO2 emission damage refers only to a mid-low
estimate of global warming damages, the sole category of damages considered for this pollutant in the
ExternE-Core project.22
 All the simulation exercises that follow were performed using the Non-Linear Programming
solver MINOS5 of GAMS.
4.1 Model Implementation: Perfect Competition.
Building a cost minimisation benchmark is a standard procedure in computable model design
and does not present particular difficulties. Some minor issues arise when computing the
optimal tax since this can result in a highly non-linear problem. This obstacle can be overcome
by exploiting equation (7), that is, by imposing the rule that equates taxes to marginal damages
as a constraint of the social cost minimisation problem (5’).
Starting from an arbitrary level of consumer demand in each country, we consider the effect of
the introduction of optimal taxes as tool for steering production choices towards the
environmentally optimal allocation. In our example, the effect is noticeable, as the following
figures show.





















































































































Figure 2. Taxes under Perfect Competition
Minor variability among countries can be observed as to output produced by means of different
technology; however the optimal allocation is almost totally symmetrical, as to taxes,
emissions, emission damages, and consumption. All trade flows are zero, and electricity is
produced and sold locally.
















































































































 Imperfect competition among producers for given taxes, can be implemented by means of an
iterative algorithm. The profit of each firm is maximised keeping fixed the output and sales
decisions of the other firms, until the difference in Xcen,z,n,m between two successive iteration is
smaller than a (negligible) pre-set tolerance e. This procedure is illustrated in the flow chart
below:
Figure 3. Cournot Equilibrium Algorithm.
Turning to our example, in comparison with the perfect competition case, we notice a 21%
decrease in equilibrium output. This already causes generation to take place in a more
environmental friendly way, being performed mainly by means of nuclear and renewable
energy.  There is still some residual use of coal and waste incineration plants. This situation






























































Figure 4 Cournot Competition outcome.
output per country 







































Figure 5 Comparison of Damages.
With the exception of the case of emissions of waste incinerators, Cournot competition brings
about improvements in environmental quality comparable with those produced by an optimal
environmental tax under perfect competition, at least in our simple example. Emissions of


































































































































































produce at full capacity in both scenarios. This fact is of course the reason of the dominance of
the perfect competition optimal taxes scenario over the Cournot pre-tax scenario even from an
environmental point of view alone. Moreover, it hints at the crucial importance of the
technological characteristics of the available plants in each country.
 It is also worth noticing that imperfect competition induces trade. Trade flows among
countries, environmental taxes, emissions, emission damages, and consumption are, as
expected, again almost totally symmetrical in the equilibrium allocation.































































4.3 Model Implementation: Responsible Governments.
We consider now the case in which governments set environmental taxes without taking into
account the strategic implications of their decisions.
The fastest and safest way to obtain such equilibrium in our computational model is to take
fully into account the fact that, in this case, the first order conditions for the governments with
respect to environmental taxes, again boil down to the rule that equates taxes to marginal
damages. Hence we simply impose equation (7) as a constraint of each firm’s profit
maximisation problem in the routine used to implement the Cournot equilibrium without
environmental taxes. This time, obviously, we do not fix taxes to any value: equation (7) will
drive them to their optimal value.
It can be checked that this is indeed the optimal value from the government point of view, by
resorting to a more complicate iterative procedure. Starting from the Cournot equilibrium
without taxes, we let each government set its taxes in turn, keeping fixed the taxes set by the
other governments. We run again the firms’ stage routine (modified as described above), and
then let the governments update their taxes, and so on until the difference in taxes between two
successive iteration is smaller than a (negligible) pre-set tolerance e. This procedure gives the
same outcome as the fast one described in the previous paragraph, implying that the latter
procedure is optimal also for the governments.
 Imposing environmental taxes under imperfect competition induces a further shift away from
air polluting technologies, and drives emissions and environmental damages to negligible levels,
the lowest of the four scenarios considered so far. This however does not involve major
changes in technology choices of the producers, which were already relying heavily on
emission-free plants. The outcome remains fairly symmetric; however, there is a minor
reshuffling of production, with Belgium and the Netherlands producing a tiny fraction more
than the other two countries. This is probably due to the residual numerical inaccuracy of the
program, and should disappear by choosing a smaller tolerance parameter. The outcome is
depicted in the graphs below.30
Figure 7  “Responsible Governments” scenario outcome.

















































































































































































































































Figure 8. Taxes in the “ Responsible Governments” Scenario.
 Taxes are decidedly lower than those enforced under perfect competition, and affect available
technologies differently. This is expected, because in our formulation, marginal damages are
directly proportional to output. Notice that co-generation plants, which would not have been
operated anyway under Cournot competition, are not taxed. A general comparison can be
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Table 6. The Four Scenarios Compared.
4.4 Model Implementation: Strategic Governments.
 What the analysis performed so far has shown is that assuming imperfect competition instead
of perfect competition can have important consequences for a model that seeks to characterise
the environmental policy choices for member countries of a trade agreement. Imperfect
competition per se involves a reduction in production and a shift towards technologies that can
be different than those chosen under perfect competition, and both these facts can be very
significant from the environmental point of view.
This is not the end of the story, however. Our analysis still misses the crucial link between
imperfect competition and environmental policy singled out by Barrett and Conrad, among the
others. More precisely, we would like at this stage to take into account the fact that
governments may be aware of the implications for international trade of their environmental
policy choices.
In order to do this, we need to implement a routine in which the equilibrium effects of the taxes
on the decision of the firms are correctly taken into account. Now, we already noted that
Kuhn–Tucker conditions (9) implicitly define the electricity generated by each firm as a
Million Euros
B D F NL B D F NL
Resource Cost 6276.538 6276.538 6276.538 6276.538 6281.575 6281.575 6281.605 6281.575
Damage SO2 23.189 23.189 23.189 23.189 0.555 0.555 0.555 0.555
Damage NOx 12.650 12.650 12.650 12.650 0.196 0.196 0.196 0.196
Damage CO2 891.265 891.265 891.265 891.265 65.793 65.793 65.793 65.793
 Damage TSP 0.352 0.352 0.352 0.352 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
Damage Total 927.456 927.456 927.456 927.456 66.554 66.554 66.554 66.554
Tax Revenue  0 0 0 0 133.108 133.108 133.108 133.108
B D F NL B D F NL
Resource Cost 6034.702 6034.702 6034.699 6034.699 6037.312 6037.307 6037.302 6037.305
Damage SO2 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.094 0.094 0.094 0.089
Damage NOx 1.180 1.180 1.180 1.180 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050
Damage CO2 146.472 146.472 146.472 146.472 9.086 9.093 9.095 9.076
 Damage TSP 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0 0 0 0
Damage Total 147.818 147.818 147.818 147.818 0.009916 0.009916 0.009916 0.009916
Tax Revenue  0 0 0 0 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018
 Perfect Competition Pre-Taxes  Perfect Competition  AfterTaxes
Cournot Pre tax Cournot after tax33
function of the taxes set by the governments:  The safest strategy would be to solve conditions
(9) for the explicit formulation of X in terms of taxes; but this not a viable option given the
high dimensionality of our problem
21.
A more promising strategy would be to use Kuhn–Tucker conditions (9) as constraints to the
governments’ problem. The flow-chart below illustrates the proposed routine:
Figure 9. “Strategic Governments” scenario. Equilibrium algorithm.
                                                       
21  This fact also prevents us from applying the same shortcut we used in the “responsible
governments” case. In other words, we cannot directly impose condition (14) as a constraint of the
firms’ problem, because we need to know the explicit formulation of and Xcen,z,i-n,m (Tem,z,n, Tem,z,-n) and
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 Notice that we do not fix output levels when solving the governments’ problem, because the
Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the firms should take care of their compatibility with the second
stage equilibrium:
Although this is not a particularly complex theoretical problem, its computational
implementation is fraught with practical difficulties. The algorithm we have devised for
representing this scenario has always run into fundamental infeasibilities in the several versions
we attempted.
 The source of these infeasibilities appears to be twofold. On one hand, if the shadow values of
constraints 2-4 are fixed, they may not be compatible with the governments’ equilibrium
22.
On the other hand, if we let these shadow values free to adjust to the optimal allocation in the
government’s stage, Kuhn-Tucker conditions (9) become highly non-linear and GAMS has
serious difficulties coping with very non-linear problems. Bounds and starting values for all
variables and multipliers should then be carefully chosen and there is no guarantee that a global
optimum can be obtained. This however appears to be a typical problem of this class of
models.
 Nevertheless, we can still give a flavour of the effect of taking strategic incentives into account
by resorting to a simple ex-post evaluation of one governments of successive reductions in its
own environmental taxes, keeping the other governments’ taxes fixed to their “responsible”
level. In practice, we run the firm’s algorithm for several different levels of its own taxes, each
level corresponding to a uniform reduction of the optimal taxes. We evaluate each outcome
using two alternative versions of a government’s welfare function, one including consumers’
surplus, profits tax revenues and environmental damages, the other not including consumers’
surplus. The results of this simulation are reported in Figure 10.













































CS included CS not  included35
 The graph shows that there is indeed a tiny incentive for a government to reduce his taxes
while the other governments keep them fixed to the optimal level. This effect is dampened by
inclusion of consumers’ surplus in the welfare function. This fact implies that the increase in
national output spurred by the tax reduction is partially contrasted by the decrease in the
competitors’ sales on this market. On the other hand, the graph also shows that this government
surely does not welcome a uniform increase in taxes
Note that this exercise shares its naivety with the assumed behaviour of agents in a Nash
equilibrium: each player plays his strategy taking as given the strategy of the other players.
Thus, these increases in welfare are exactly what would move a government to behave
strategically in a Nash equilibrium setting.
Although this cannot be conveniently shown in the graph above, it must be noted that further
reduction in the taxes applied unilaterally by one government result in high environmental
damages, which imply strong reduction in welfare, and hence strategic incentives disappear
23.
This is due to the concavity of the government’s ex-post welfare function.
More generally the strategic government equilibrium is not likely to involve such a strong
incentive to reduce environmental taxes as Figure 10 may prima facie suggest. For one thing,
governments will have a wider choice in setting their taxes than simply uniform changes in all
pollutants and technologies. More importantly, the graph above fails to take into account the
reaction of the governments to the taxes set by their counterparts.
5. Conclusion
 In this paper we have surveyed a number of issues that compound the problem of the
environmental regulation of the European electricity sector, and we have made a first attempt
to build a computable model that could in principle tackle them.
                                                                                                                                                              
22 The reason for keeping these multipliers fixed to their value in firms’ problem is that these values
can be regarded as intermediate estimates of their true value. One hopes that in equilibrium the
routine above would have updated their value to their true one (or to a value reasonably close to it).
23  In our case this happens for a 97.5% reduction in environmental taxes with respect to the optimal
level. However,  this may be implied by less strong reductions when higher marginal damages are
assumed.36
 In the first part of the paper, we have singled out a number of problematic traits of the
European electricity sector. This industry appears to be characterised by a high degree of
heterogeneity among countries, in terms of technologies used, of environmental policies
adopted, and of relevance of environmental problems. Moreover, power generation contributes
significantly to cross–border pollution and global environmental issues. Finally, we have
pointed out that the institutional setting of the European market for electricity is likely to be
dominated by imperfect competition.
 In the second part of the paper we have specified and implemented a first, embryonic version
of a computable model for the liberalised European electricity market. Even within our very
simplified framework, we were able to show that the assumption about the form of competition
assumed can be crucial if the main focus of the model is environmental policy. Moreover, we
have shown that the strategic incentives singled out by the Trade and Environment literature,
can still be noticed in a computable model more complex than the international duopoly setting
in which the theoretical analysis is usually cast. However the complete characterisation of
equilibrium entailing strategic behaviour on the part of the governments has so far escaped us,
mainly due to fundamental implementation problems of the solver.
5.1. Directions for future research.
 This paper is more an assessment of work in progress than the summary of a concluded
research. There is a lot of work that still needs to be done.
 The first and most difficult item on the agenda is surely the implementation of a solution
algorithm for the strategic government case. A reasonably promising procedure is for instance
the one devised by Hogan (1997) for a similar (yet simpler) problem. Hogan considers the
problem of strategic interactions in an electric transmission network where large generators and
a competitive fringe compete in a Cournot setting. The solution of Hogan’s problem requires
the use of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the competitive fringe as constraints of the large
producers’ problem. His implementation strategy involves the relaxation of the large
producers’ problem by means of a penalty function, which allows a small violation of the
complementarity conditions. By iteratively reducing the relaxation of the program, Hogan
manages to approximate the equilibrium solution, but he warns that the convergence of this
procedure to a unique equilibrium solution is not always granted.
 The second priority in our agenda is making our model more realistic. The present completely
symmetric setting is a necessary but intermediate stage. We would like to extend our model to
more countries, to more competitors in each country, and to use more accurate data for the37
technology used in each country. It would also be interesting to introduce a less naïve
characterisation of transmission network. On the environmental side, a realistic model should
allow for damages not directly related to air emissions, for asymmetries among countries as to
the environmental situation and the instruments used in each country to regulate it, and should
consider international environmental issues such as cross-border pollution.
Finally, although there are very good reasons for sticking to a Cournot setting
24, we would to
compare it with alternative forms of competitions such as Bertrand competition. The Trade and
Environment literature in fact suggests that competing in prices rather than in quantities may
reverse the direction of the strategic incentives of the governments
25.
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